

Section I: Additional Description of Variables

Ideology Variable

As mentioned in the main text, the data are restricted to groups with identifiable political ideologies to ensure that only politically motivated groups are included. Ideology is a contested concept in its own right. However, recent studies have converged around similar definitions (Maynard and Mildenerger 2018; Maynard 2019). Ugarriza and Craig (2012, 450) define ideology as “a set of political beliefs that promotes a particular way of understanding the world and shapes relations between members of a group and outsiders,” whereas Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood (2014, 215) consider ideology “a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group” and an articulation of the “grievances or challenges that the group confronts.” In short, there is some consensus that an ideology articulates a worldview, an ingroup to which adherents belong, and an outgroup.

The ideology variable has six categories: anarchist, nationalist, left-wing, right-wing, religious, and other. Following the ‘waves of terrorism’ literature (e.g. Rapoport 2001), anarchist, left-wing, nationalist, and religious are the ideologies of the recognized four waves of revolutionary terrorism. Right-wing ideology is certainly not revolutionary but nonetheless fits the definition of ideology as defined above. These ideologies fit our definition since they articulate a worldview and divide the world into ingroups and outgroups (see Sageman 2017; Berger 2018). Admittedly, the definition of ideology above excludes groups with more specific political objectives that may not bifurcate the world into ingroups and outgroups. Such groups, however, are politically motivated and thus should be included, and these are placed into the ‘other’ category. Additionally, groups are coded as having only a single ideology. Although this does capture the full complexity of terrorist group ideology, secondary categories are usually more ambiguous and not further disaggregation limits quantitative analysis (e.g. labeling the People’s Will and several other groups as nihilist is more amenable to qualitative historical research). Some groups, such as the ETA and IRA, fit both the nationalist and leftist category. However, since these are separatist organizations they are coded as nationalist groups; separatist groups are coded as nationalists since, even though they vary along important ideological dimensions, their primary objective is to cleave a national homeland away from an existing state.

It is intended that the ideology variable serve as a useful point of departure for scholars who wish to divide groups along other salient ideological lines.

Determining which ideological category a group fits into is a non-trivial matter, although in most cases terrorist groups are quite vocal about their ideological objectives. For instance, most *anarchist* groups are identified based on self-identification as an anarchist group. Some exceptions exist. For instance, the Russian nihilists, such as the People’s Will, that kickstarted the anarchist wave were not anarchists per se, and their belief-system included proto-socialist elements. These are coded as ‘anarchist’ groups, since proponents of the ‘waves of terrorism’ thesis locate the beginning of the anarchist wave with the Russian nihilists (Rapoport 2001). Little value is gained by labeling these few groups under a separate ‘nihilist’ category, and thus they are coded as anarchist to maintain consistency with the existing literature.

Left-wing is a more heterogeneous category, and few terrorist groups explicitly adopt this label for themselves. Instead, the following heuristics are used to code an organization as left-wing: the group 1) self-identifies as socialist, 2) self-identifies as communist (including Maoist and Marxist-Leninist groups), or 3) otherwise fights to transform the political system for equity purposes. Terrorist groups such as the Weather Underground, which sought to overturn the US government due to its perceived imperialism, are included in this last category. As mentioned earlier, separatist groups who pursue some leftist ambitions, such as framing their conflict as an egalitarian one, are not coded as leftist since these goals are subordinate the overarching quest to separate a national homeland from an existing state.

Nationalist is a more straightforward category. Groups are coded as nationalist when they are either fighting 1) a separatist campaign to cleave away an ethnic homeland from an existing state or 2) an anti-colonial campaign meant to dispel a colonial power from the territory. Rapoport (2001) considers the latter more emblematic of the second wave of terrorism. However, there are few other nationalist (i.e., separatist) terrorist groups during the early period and thus the aggregation appears warranted lest “separatist” groups are relegated to “other” or a separate category. As Robert Pape (2005) has shown, often separatist terrorist groups are motivated to expel groups they perceive as ‘occupiers’ even when they reside in the same state. Since this logic is the same as that underlying anti-colonial movements, treating them as a single nationalist category appears conceptually consistent. Decoupling these groups based on whether they are nationalist or anti-colonial is straightforward. Following Sprinzak’s (1995) foundational work,

white nationalist and racist groups are coded as right-wing since their primary contention is against groups perceived as illegitimate rather than the government.

Groups are coded as *religious* when their primary objective involves imposition of religious rule over a state or religiously-oriented policy change; groups that have other primary objectives, such as separatism, and adhere to a common religion are not coded as religious. This category is included for consistency with the waves of terrorism thesis, although as Rapoport (2002) observes this wave did not truly commence until 1979. Since this is after the data ends, there are very few groups coded as religious.

Right-wing groups are outside the revolutionary ideologies relevant to the four waves theory but represent an important ideological category in its own right. As Sprinzak (1995, 17) writes, these groups are unlike revolutionary terrorists in that they do not support “universal values” but against “‘illegitimate’ religious denominations, classes of undesired people or ‘inferior races.’” In line with this conceptualization, the following types of organizations are coded as right-wing: ethnonationalist groups excluding separatists (see Harff 2003 on doctrines of ethnonationalist superiority as an ideological category), proto or neo-fascist groups, vigilante groups not sponsored by the state, and groups whose primary policy objective is exclusionary (racial segregation or other exclusion of ethnic, sexual, or gender minorities). For instance, the Ku Klux Klan and other racist reconstruction era terrorist groups in the United States are coded as right-wing.

Other groups are terrorist organizations that do not fit readily into these categories but employ terrorist tactics in pursuit of some political objective. Many groups falling into the latter category are what other scholars term ‘single-issue terrorists,’ or groups motivated by idiosyncratic policy objectives such as environmentalism. For instance, the earliest case in the data is the Molly Maguires, a terrorist organization operating Pennsylvania and West Virginia that protested against poor working conditions (see Kumamoto 2014). Although they do not fit into under the broad ideological categories that characterize the revolutionary waves, the Molly Maguires nonetheless used terrorist tactics for patently political objectives.

Ambiguous Variable

A final variable is included for whether the case is *ambiguous*, i.e., there is doubt as to whether the group constitutes a terrorist organization as defined in the main text. Some examples

illustrate the types of issues leading to ambiguous coding. One is the notorious Bonnot Gang, which operated in France in the early twentieth century. Although the group declared itself an anarchist organization, and overlaps temporally with other French anarchist groups, it was primarily engaged in criminal activity such as bank robbery. Therefore, the Bonnot Gang might be more accurately described as a criminal rather than terrorist organization, since it possibly used the ‘anarchist’ label as a justification for criminal behavior. We include this organization in the dataset since it is frequently discussed in the literature on anarchist terrorism, although it is coded as ambiguous to enable analysis using only those groups that less ambiguously meet the inclusion criteria.

Other groups straddle the line between terrorist organization and cognate violent non-state actors such as pro-government militias (see Carey and Mitchell 2017). For instance, the Genyosha, an organization active in late twentieth century Japan, committed terrorist attacks, including bombings and assassination of public figures. At the same time, it appears that the group often cooperated with the Japanese government, including overseas espionage operations. For several other organizations there is simply insufficient evidence to determine whether they committed bombings and assassinations, which are used to operationalize terrorism, even when numerous sources attribute the ‘terrorist’ label to the organization. Such cases are also coded as ambiguous.

Lastly, there are a few groups that did not commit bombings or assassinations but *prima facie* fit the terrorism label. These may fit under the definition of terrorism used in the article but are false negatives due to the imperfect operationalization. These are coded as ambiguous as well. One example is illustrative: the Jewish organization Nakam sought to use chemical weapons against German civilians in retaliation for the Holocaust. While the group poisoned bread that led to sickness in at least 2,000 German civilians, no known deaths are attributed to Nakam’s actions. Politically-motivated poisoning certainly fits the terrorism label, although the failed plots further distinguish it from other terrorist groups in the data. Therefore, the ambiguous label appears appropriate.

References:

Berger, J.M. 2018. *Extremism*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Carey, Sabine and Neil Mitchell. 2017. “Progovernment Militias.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 127-147.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco & Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2014. “Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 213-226.

Harff, Barbara. 2003. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder.” *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 57–73.

Kumamoto, Robert. 2014. *The Historical Origins of Terrorism in America, 1644—1880*. London: Routledge.

Maynard, Jonathan. 2019. “Ideology and Armed Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* (forthcoming).

Maynard, Jonathan and Matto Mildemberger. 2018. “Convergence and Divergence in the Study of Ideology: A Critical Review.” *British Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 563-589.

Pape, Robert. 2005. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.

Rapoport, David. 2001. “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism.” *Current History* 100(650): 419.

Sageman, Marc. 2017. *Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sprinzak, Ehud. 1995. “Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegation.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(1) 17-43.

Ugarriza, Juan and Matthew Craig. 2012. “The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(3): 445-477.

Section II. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the dataset. There is complete information on all the variables, with the exception of the end date variable. In this case, several observations are censored since the terrorist groups are still in existence (e.g., the ELN, New People’s Army, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palesine). The number of cases coded positively on these variables is included parenthetically next to the variable name; for instance, there are 49 terrorist groups coded as anarchist in the data.

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Start Year	258	1918.66	26.27526	1860	1969
End Year	230	1937.635	34.32323	1866	2017
Anarchist (49)	258	0.19	0.39	0	1
Nationalist (96)	258	0.36	0.48	0	1
Left-wing(65)	258	0.25	0.43	0	1
Religious (6)	258	0.02	0.15	0	1
Right-wing (33)	258	0.12	0.33	0	1
Other (13)	258	0.05	0.22	0	1
Ambiguous (30)	258	0.12	0.32	0	1

*Number of cases in parentheses

It is similarly worth looking at the duration of terrorist groups, which is depicted in figure A1. As shown, approximately seventeen percent of groups exist for only a single year. Although quite a few are genuinely transitory groups whose termination is evident within a year, as mentioned in the main text many small groups abruptly appear and disappear from the historical record. It is possible that some of these groups remained active for several years, although information on their activity past their first attacks are perhaps forever lost. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the latest research; Phillips (2017) finds that between 25 and 74 percent of terrorist organizations last no longer than a single year. Since this figure is lower, a more likely scenario is that many transitory historical terrorist groups do not enter the historical record at all. Although this is regrettable, as mentioned in the main text there is no easy solution to rectifying this limitation.




Figure A1. Terrorist Group Duration

References:

Phillips, Brian. 2017. “Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom.” Forthcoming in *Terrorism and Political Violence*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1361411>.

Section III. Robustness Checks**Table A1. Robustness Checks**

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Polity 2	2.817* (1.522)	3.235** (1.611)	2.912* (1.702)	3.165** (1.609)
Polity 2 Squared	-2.916** (1.443)	-3.231** (1.462)	-3.068** (1.545)	-3.200** (1.485)
Civil War	-0.246 (0.571)			
Civil War (alternative)		1.267*** (0.274)	1.240*** (0.353)	
Civil War (t – 1)				0.805*** (0.362)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.812*** (0.216)	1.039*** (0.187)	1.019*** (0.189)	0.962*** (0.205)
Population (ln)	0.666*** (0.137)	0.616*** (0.094)	0.755*** (0.115)	0.630*** (0.129)
Constant	-20.75*** (3.733)	-22.20*** (2.616)	-24.98*** (3.032)	-21.61*** (3.445)
Observations	4,291	4,349	4,349	4,327
Model	Logit	RE	NB	Logit

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

RE=random effects; NB=negative binomial

This section presents several robustness checks to ensure the stability of the curvilinear relationship between terrorism and democracy found in the main text. Model 3 uses an alternative measure for civil war reaching a 1,000 battle deaths threshold from Haber and Menaldo (2001).¹ Model 4 uses random effects to better account for heterogeneity across units; recent simulation evidence indicates that this approach outperforms alternatives such as fixed effects estimation strategies (see Bell and Jones 2015), especially when examining the effects of slow-moving variables such as democracy (see Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001, and responses in

¹ This variable comes from the Varieties of Democracy 8 dataset, which collates several variables from disparate sources over a long period of time.

International Organization). Model 5 uses the number of terrorist groups formed in a country-year as an alternative dependent variable and estimates the model using negative binomial regression, since the dependent variable is a count and the data is over-dispersed (i.e., the variance is significantly greater than the mean, making negative binomial regression a more appropriate strategy than Poisson regression). The evidence is generally supportive of the curvilinear relationship between terrorism and democracy. The coefficient on the Polity squared term drops to the 10 percent error level in significance when using the count dependent variable and negative binomial regression, although as discussed in the text the limited number of counts greater than one makes using this approach questionable when compared with using a binary dependent variable and logistic regression. Since the untransformed Polity score does not reach statistical significance in these models, it is reasonable to conclude that the curvilinear hypothesis is more likely true than the linear hypothesis. Model 6 replaces the contemporaneous value of civil war with its lagged value. Since a relationship between these variables could feasibly capture the onset of a civil war by an insurgent group that uses terrorist tactics, this relationship could be tautological and therefore theoretically useless. Using a lagged value ensures that the analysis is capturing terrorist groups that are formed after a civil war initiated by other armed actors. Although this variable drops in statistical significance, it still reaches the 5 percent error level in significance. In short, there is fairly robust evidence of a curvilinear relationship between terrorism and democracy and evidence that terrorist groups are formed during civil war.

Several other tests are also carried out. Table 2 shows the results when using the ordinal Polity scale rather than the normalized version. Here the linear effect of democracy on terrorism disappears, but the non-linear relationship remains. Another possibility is that the effects are driven by the fractionalization component of the Polity score, which has been shown to influence results on the relationship between democracy and civil war. Table 3 therefore replicates the models using Vreeland’s (2008) XPolity score, which removes the fractionalization component of the Polity measure. As shown, the results are equivalent to those found when using the normal Polity 2 scale; there is no linear relationship between terrorism and democracy, but the

Table 2. Using Ordinal Polity Score

	Model 7	Model 8
Polity 2	0.0002 (0.0231)	-0.0008 (0.0195)
Polity 2 squared	-0.0081** (0.00374)	-0.0078** (0.00363)
Civil War	1.267*** (0.349)	1.374*** (0.271)
GDP per capita (ln)	1.039*** (0.203)	1.029*** (0.186)
Population (ln)	0.616*** (0.120)	0.610*** (0.0929)
Constant	-21.39*** (3.106)	-21.18*** (2.481)
Observations	4,349	4,349
Model	Logit	PML

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PML=penalized maximum likelihood

curvilinear relationship remains. A final concern is the strength of the relationship over time. The waves of terrorism theory suggests that terrorism changed fundamentally at critical junctures (Rapoport 2001). The first wave of anarchist terrorism concluded with the outbreak of WWI, and the nationalist anticolonial wave commenced shortly after the end of WWII. Table 3 therefore replicates the results after including binary indicators for whether the time period is post-WWI or post-WWII, respectively. As shown, the main results remain unchanged. Lastly, table 5 includes a variable for whether the country is Western, which is operationalized as whether the country is the United States or Canada, Australia, or in Western or Eastern Europe. As shown, the coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that Western countries are not more likely to spawn terrorist groups conditional on other variables in the model.

Table 3. Using X-Polity Score

	Model 9	Model 10
XPolity	0.0650 (0.0440)	0.0627* (0.0375)
XPolity squared	-0.0198** (0.00755)	-0.0194** (0.00844)
Civil War	1.246*** (0.374)	1.256*** (0.273)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.760*** (0.176)	0.752*** (0.161)
Population (ln)	0.540*** (0.0967)	0.535*** (0.0861)
Constant	-17.69*** (2.493)	-17.53*** (2.028)
Observations	4,207	4,207
Model	Logit	PML

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PML=penalized maximum likelihood

Table 4. Post-WWI and WWII Eras

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Polity 2	3.923** (1.760)	3.838** (1.593)	3.919** (1.581)	3.819** (1.604)
Polity 2 squared	-3.829** (1.571)	-3.757*** (1.446)	-3.819*** (1.465)	-3.733** (1.453)
Civil War	-0.323 (0.561)	-0.223 (0.534)	-0.279 (0.588)	-0.177 (0.525)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.741*** (0.207)	0.732*** (0.182)	0.710*** (0.196)	0.701*** (0.180)
Population (ln)	0.636*** (0.132)	0.630*** (0.0982)	0.620*** (0.129)	0.614*** (0.0973)
Post-WWI	0.637** (0.301)	0.624** (0.293)		
Post-WWII			0.623** (0.262)	0.624 (0.247)
Constant	-20.39*** (3.603)	-20.16*** (2.578)	-19.66*** (3.523)	-19.43*** (2.556)
Observations	4,291	4,291	4,291	4,291
Model	Logit	PML	Logit	PML

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PML=penalized maximum likelihood

Table 5. Control for Western Countries

	Model 15	Model 16
Polity 2	2.759* (1.643)	2.642* (1.572)
Polity 2 squared	-2.592* (1.511)	-2.495* (1.436)
Civil War	1.097*** (0.326)	1.102*** (0.275)
GDP per capita (ln)	1.167*** (0.167)	1.158*** (0.187)
Population (ln)	0.629*** (0.102)	0.622*** (0.0903)
Western	-0.773*** (0.237)	-0.776** (0.258)
Constant	-23.06*** (2.879)	-22.81*** (2.631)
Observations	4,349	4,349
Model	Logit	PML

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PML=penalized maximum likelihood

Section IV: Sources Used for Data Collection

This section presents a partial bibliography of the sources consulted for constructing the dataset of historical terrorist groups. Several general histories have been omitted as well as many sources that failed to yield information relevant to this project.

Anderson, Benedict. 2005. *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination*. London: Verso.

Apter, David and James Joll. Eds. 1970. *Anarchism Today*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Badrawi, Malak. 2013. *Political Violence in Egypt, 1910-1924: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations*. New York: Routledge.

Berry, David. 2009. *A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917-1945*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Best, Steven and Anthony Nocella. 2004. *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals*. New York: Lantern.

Buckley, Patricia and Anne Walthall. 2014. *East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History*. Boston: Wadsworth.

Burke, Edmund. 1993. *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cashman, Sean. 1984. *America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*. New York: New York University Press.

Chalcraft, John. 2011. “Migration and Popular Protest in the Arabia Peninsula and the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s.” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 79:28-47.

Chaliand, Gérard, and Arnaud Blin. Eds. 2007 *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clayton, Barbara. 1979. *The Lone-Star Conspiracy: Racial Violence and Ku Klux Klan Terror in Post-Civil War Texas, 1865-1877*. MA Thesis. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University.

Clutterbuck, Lindsay. 2004. “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(1): 154-181.

Clutterbuck, Lindsay. 2006. “Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(1): 95-118.

Crim, Brian. 2007. “Terror from the Right: Revolutionary Terrorism and the Failure of the Weimar Republic.” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27(2).

Crump, John. 1996. *The Anarchist Movement in Japan, 1906-1996*. London: Anarchist Library.

Denis, Nelson. 2015. *War Against All Puerto Ricans: Revolution and Terror in America's Colony*. New York: Nation Books.

Geifman, Anna. 1993. *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Geifman, Anna. 2010. *Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas. 2002. *Black Sun: Aryan Roots, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity*. New York: New York University Press.

Gordon, Andrew. 2003. *A History of Modern Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Great Britain, Parliament. 1918. *Report of Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Conspiracies in India*. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.

Hart, John. 2001. *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class, 1860-1931*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Heehs, Peter. 1992. “The Maniktala Secret Society: An Early Bengali Terrorist Group.” *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 29(3): 349-370.

Heehs, Peter. 1993. *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900—1910*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heehs, Peter. 1994. “Foreign Influences on Bengali Revolutionary Terrorism 1902-1908.” *Modern Asian Studies* 28(3): 533-556.

Hewitt, Christopher. 2003. *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda*. New York: Routledge.

Hirsh, Steven, and Lucien Van Der Walt. Eds. 2010. *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870-1940: The Praxis of National Liberation, Internationalism, and Social Revolution*. Leiden: Brill.

Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Hoffman, Bruce. 2007. "Terrorism in History." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27(2): 8-28.
- Hwang, Dongyoun. 2016. *Anarchism in Korea: Independence, Transnationalism, and the Question of National Development 1919-1984*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Katsiaficas, George. 2012. *Asia's Unknown Uprisings: South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
- Kumamoto, Robert. 2014. *The Historical Origins of Terrorism in America, 1644—1880*. London: Routledge.
- Jacob, Frank. 2014. *Japanism, Pan-Asianism, and Terrorism: A Short History of the Amur Society, 1901 – 1945*. Palo Alto, CA: Academica.
- Jamal, Amaney. 2009. *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jensen, Richard. 2001. "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1914." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(1): 15-46.
- Jensen, Richard. 2004. "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(1): 116-153.
- Jensen, Richard. 2008. "Nineteenth Century Anarchist Terrorism: How Comparable to the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(4): 589-596.
- Jensen, Richard. 2009. "The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880–1930s." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(1): 89-109.
- Jensen, Richard. 2013. *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jensen, Richard. 2015. "Anarchist Terrorism and Global Diasporas, 1878–1914." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27(3): 441-453.
- Kemp, Michael. 2018. *Bomb, Bullets and Bread: The Politics of Anarchist Terrorism Worldwide, 1866-1926*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Kramer, Gundrun. 2008. *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Laqueur, Walter. 2002. *A History of Terrorism*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1997. *Fascism: Past, Present, Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laqueur, Walter. 1977. *Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Largem Stephen. 2001. “Nationalist Extremism in Early Showa Japan: Inoue Nissho and the ‘Blood-Pledge Corps Incident’, 1932.” *Modern Asian Studies* 35(3): 633-564.

Law, Randall. 2009. *Terrorism: A History*. Cambridge: Polity.

Law, Randall. Ed. 2015. *The Routledge History of Terrorism*. London: Routledge.

Lovett, Verney. 1968. *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*. London: Frank Cass.

Lutz, James and Brenda Lutz. 2005. *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maura, J. Romero. 1968. “Terrorism in Barcelona and Its Impact on Spanish Politics, 1904, 1909.” *Past & Present* 41: 130-183.

McPherson, Alan. 2019. “Caribbean Taliban: Cuban American Terrorism in the 1970s.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31(2): 390-409.

Melson, Robert. 1992. *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Messer-Kruse, Timothy. 2012. *The Haymarket Conspiracy: Transatlantic Anarchist Networks*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Miller, Martin. 2013. *The Foundations of Modern Terrorism: State, Society and the Dynamics of Political Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moorehouse, Roger. 2006. *Killing Hitler: The Plots, the Assassins, and the Dictator Who Cheated Death*. New York: Bantam.

Morris, Benny. 1999. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*. New York: Vintage.

Nambiar, Harish. 2012. *Defragmenting India: Riding a Bullet through the Gathering Storm*. London: Sage.

Norman, Herbert. 1944. “The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism.” *Pacific Affairs* 17(3): 261-284.

Office of the Vice President. *Terrorist Group Profiles*. Washington DC: Office of the Vice President.

Offord, Derek. 1986. *The Russian Revolutionary Movements in the 1880s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Parella, Andrew. 2018. “The Black Legion: J. Edgar Hoover and Fascism in the Depression Era.” *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 12(2): 81-106.
- Parsons, Elaine. 2016. *Ku-Klux: The Birth of the Klan During Reconstruction*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Payne, Stanley. 1990. “Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 25(2): 269-288.
- Paz, Abel. 2011. *The Story of the Iron Column: Militant Anarchism in the Spanish Civil War*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Pedazhur, Ami and Arie Perliger. *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pegram, Thomas. 2011. *One Hundred Percent American: The Rebirth and Decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s*. Chicago: Ivan Dee.
- Perry, Elizabeth. 1985. “Rural Violence in Socialist China.” *China Quarterly* 103: 414-440.
- Perry, Elizabeth. 2006. *Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Pipes, Richard. 2003. *The Degaev Affair: Terrorism and Treason in Tsarist Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Pomper, Philip. 1986. *Lenin’s Brother: The Origins of the October Revolution*. New York: Norton.
- Porat, Dina. 2009. *The Fall of a Sparrow: The Life and Times of Abba Kovner*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Raddeker, Helene. 1997. *Treacherous Women of Imperial Japan: Patricia Fictions, Patricidal Fantasies*. London: Routledge.
- Rapoport, David. 1971. *Assassination and Terrorism*. Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
- Rapoport, David. 2001. “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism.” *Current History* 100(650): 419.
- Rasler, Karen, and William Thompson. 2008. “Looking for Waves of Terrorism.” *Terrorism and political violence* 21(1): 28-41.

Raun, Toivo. 1984. “The Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland.” *Slavic Review* 43(3): 453-467.

Reid, Donald. 1982. “Political Assassination in Egypt, 1910-1954.” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15(4): 625-651.

Ree, Erik Van. 2008. “Reluctant Terrorists? Transcaucasian Social-Democracy, 1901 – 1909.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60(1): 127-154.

Ross, Jeffrey Ian. 1992. “Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Violence in Canada: A Quantitative Analysis.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4(3): 72-101.

Sageman, Marc. 2017. *Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sanyal, Shukla. 2014. *Revolutionary Pamphlets, Propaganda and Political Culture in Colonial Bengal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schmid, Alex. 2011. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. New York: Routledge.

Shilloney, Ben-Ami. 1973. *Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Silke, Andrew. 1997. “Honor and Expulsion: Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Japan.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9(4): 58-81.

Simon, Jeffrey. 2008. “The Forgotten Terrorists: Lessons from the History of Terrorism.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20(2): 195-214.

Siniawer, Eiko. 2008. *Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860 – 1960*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Solahudin. 2006. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiya*. University of New South Wales Press.

Stanley, Thomas. 1982. *Osugi Sakae: Anarchist in Taisho Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Suchlicki, Jaime. 1968. “Stirring of Cuban Nationalism: The Student Generation of 1930.” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 10(3): 350-368.

Tudor, Lucian. 2014. “The Romanian Iron Guard: Its Origins, History, and Legacy.” *The Occidental Quarterly* 14(1): 65-101.

Verhoeven, Claudia. 2009. *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wakeman, Frederick. 1996. *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger. 2009. *Political Parties and Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.

Weiner, Michael. 1989. *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910-1923*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Wieviorka, Michel. *The Making of Terrorism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilkinson, Paul. 2001. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Routledge.

Yaroslavsky, E. *History of Anarchism in Russia*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.