

## **ONLINE APPENDIX**

This online appendix for “Cleansing the Caliphate: Insurgent Violence against Sexual Minorities” is divided into three sections. First, there is an additional discussion of the dependent variable, including the data sources used in making coding decisions. This section also addresses all the positive cases where sexual minorities were targeted by non-state actors, an especially important task given the rarity of such violence. Second, there is additional discussion of the independent variables. The third section contains a series of robustness checks that are presented to confirm that the initial results are sensitive to alternative model specifications and coding decisions.

### ***Section I: Dependent Variable***

Before moving to the coding rules for the dependent variable, a brief discussion of the data structure is in order. This paper uses the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which contains conflict-year observations on every conflict reaching a 25 battle death threshold. Because this threshold is rather low, it includes low-level conflicts with small terrorist cells in addition to larger civil wars pitting governments against well-organized insurgents. For the purposes of this paper, this dataset is disaggregated so that each conflict-year is broken into a dyadic insurgent-state year. Accordingly, each non-state actor active in a given conflict is placed in its own observation while still allowing variance across state contexts; this latter point is necessary for testing H2, which posits that insurgent groups mirror the behavior of the state in which they are fighting. Based on the original dataset, observations drop out of the analysis when the conflict in which they are a part drops below the 25 battle death threshold. Although the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset extends back to 1945, this analysis is restricted to the years 1985 to 2015. Little reliable information on the dependent variable is available prior to this time. There are several possible explanations for this limitation. One is that there was historically little attention paid specifically to the plight of sexual minorities during wartime. What little information that is available prior to this time concerns small, Western terrorist cells—such as the bombing of a church with a homosexual congregation by the far-right group the Covenant, Sword, and the Arm of the Lord in the United States (Hamm 2007, 249)—perhaps indicating a paucity of information on the sexual identities of those victimized in non-Western conflict zones.

Coding decisions regarding attacks on sexual minorities were gathered from a variety of sources, including numerous academic books, articles, and periodicals. Hundreds of news articles were drawn from online searches using Google and databases such as Factiva and Lexis Nexis. Various combinations of relevant terms were searched through these databases; for example, [insurgent group OR country name] AND [homosexual OR LGBT OR gay OR sexual minority]. Although it is impractical to list the vast majority of sources that did not present evidence of insurgent violence based on sexual identity, some examples of the books and articles used are brought up in the discussion of the cases of homophobic violence below. The START Global Terrorism Database includes data on over 140,000 terrorist attacks, and was used to

search for instances where groups selected targets based on their sexual identity. English language sources were primarily used, although some Spanish language documents, such as those mentioned in the main text, were consulted for Latin American cases. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were especially attuned to violence against sexual minorities, if only in recent years, and were therefore invaluable sources for this project; others such as OutRight International are dedicated to covering LGBT rights in areas where they are underreported and thus unlikely to reach international or even local audiences. When available, documents from Truth and Reconciliation Commissions occasionally reported war crimes against sexual minorities, although again they are less likely to cover any sexual violence, let alone against sexual minorities, the further back in time one extends.

The dependent variable, *targeting*, is coded 1 if and only if sources indicate that the insurgent group deliberately killed at least one sexual minority during the year in question. Evidence that the insurgents targeted individuals specifically for their sexuality is the most difficult to corroborate with a high degree of certainty, since it is possible to incidentally murder sexual minorities in the course of killing generally. Yet, in most recorded instances the insurgents themselves are quite vocal about their intent to kill sexual minorities, which corresponds to the hypothesis that homophobic violence is committed in part to gain social support vis-à-vis competitors. Other evidence comes directly from those who have been tracked and threatened by insurgents, and can bear witness to the murder of sexual minorities from members of their community. While some insurgents may target sexual minorities in complete secrecy, this behavior is outside the theoretical scope of the paper. If recruitment needs are driving target selection, then violence would have to be made public in order to attract potential members. Either this means that the executions are carried out publically, or knowledge of tracking and execution of sexual minorities is made evident, such as through displaying dead bodies or hit lists. Lastly, it is assumed that attacks against venues that cater primarily to sexual minorities are intended specifically to target sexual minorities rather than being locations selected randomly.

Non-state actor abuse and violence towards sexual minorities is not considered when it falls short of homicide. As deplorable as other forms of homophobic abuse are, this paper maintains that the finality of death, especially when threatened against an entire population, justifies examining murder distinct from other offenses. Cases are therefore not coded 1 when evidence suggests that insurgent attempted to carry out attacks against sexual minorities but ultimately failed. For instance, the Malian group MUJAO captured and planned the execution of two homosexual men but was driven out of its stronghold by French airstrikes before the executions could take place (Hilsum 2013). MUJAO's homophobic violence otherwise conforms to the theory, since they had regional rivals, controlled territory, and adhered to an revolutionary jihadist ideology, but thankfully the group's efforts to carry out executions for homosexuality have failed so far. Several categories of ambiguous events are also not coded as instances of homophobic violence. One example is the pressuring of homosexuals to become

**TABLE 1A**  
**Incidents of Homophobic Killings by Insurgent Groups, 1985—2015**

| <i>Group</i>              | <i>Country</i> | <i>Years</i>      |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| Al-Mahdi Army             | Iraq           | 2007 – 2008       |
| Al-Shabaab                | Somalia        | 2013              |
| Al-Nusra Front            | Syria          | 2015              |
| Ansar al-Islam            | Iraq           | 2006              |
| Armed Islamic Group (GIA) | Algeria        | 1994, 1996 – 1997 |
| AQAP                      | Yemen          | 2011, 2013 – 2015 |
| Chechen Republic          | Russia         | 1999              |
| FARC                      | Colombia       | 2000              |
| INPFL                     | Liberia        | 1990              |
| IS                        | Iraq           | 2013 – 2015       |
| IS-Libya                  | Libya          | 2015              |
| MRTA                      | Peru           | 1989 – 1990       |
| Shining Path              | Peru           | 1986, 1988        |

Note: Based on insurgent groups listed in the non-state actor dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).

suicide bombers by Palestinian terrorist organizations, lest the victim’s sexual identity be revealed publically (Kimhi and Even 2004). Although this pressure assumes that homosexuality is a transgression worthy of death, the enlists are not directly responsible for the targets’ death. Homophobic violence by any of the Palestinian groups employing this tactic would fit the outbidding theory, and are in fact the most frequently used examples in the outbidding literature (e.g. Bloom 2005). Additionally, the process of “homosexualization” prior to killing by groups such as the Janjaweed are not covered in this analysis, since this involves treating an unidentified subject as homosexual to justify killing rather than killing due to victim’s identity as homosexual (Ferrales, Brehm, and Mcelrath 2016). One exception made is the coding of FARC as committing homophobic violence in 2000, as noted in the article, when it “disappeared” two lesbian women that the group had previously threatened (Nagle 2012:21). Disappearance implies that these women were murdered, although the physical evidence is of course not available in such instances. Recoding this observation to 0 on the dependent variable does not alter the statistical or substantive significance of any of tests presented in the article or this appendix.

As mentioned in the article, there are very few observations coded 1 on the dependent variable. While conducting in-depth case studies of each insurgent instance of targeting sexual minorities is outside the purview of this appendix, this section outlines all such observations and briefly discusses how those cases unaddressed in the article confirm or disconfirm its theoretical arguments. This section demonstrates that the other available cases are just as supportive of the paper’s central arguments as those chosen for the main analysis, alleviating concerns that the cases selected for the primary analysis are selected as the only ones to strongly confirm the posited causal mechanisms. Table 1A (the same as Table 1 in the main text) presents all

insurgent groups between 1985 and 2015 found to target sexual minorities that are present in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset. In total, there are twenty-three dyad-year observations of insurgent homophobic violence across thirteen insurgent groups.

The article discusses the cases of al-Mahdi Army, al-Nusra Front, Ansar al-Islam, AQAP, IS, FARC, MRTA, and the Shining Path. The remaining organizations also largely confirm the theoretical expectations outlined in the paper. Al-Shabaab, AQAP, and the Shining Path are outliers in that they are the only organizations to target sexual minorities that are not coded as having active rivals at the time. However, there is evidence to support the rivalry hypothesis even in these cases. For al-Shabaab, it has been noted that they started executing sexual minorities when competing against Islamist warlords in the region (Ali 2013). Despite qualitative support for the rivalry hypothesis, these warlords cannot be included in the quantitative analysis because they are not listed in the Non-State Actor Dataset. Executions of homosexuals also occurred under al-Shabaab's territorial control (European Asylum Report Office 2015, 113), and its extremist transformative ideology at that time has been well-documented (Hansen 2013). Similarly, as outlined in the main analysis, AQAP began targeting sexual minorities in 2011, a time at which it did not have active rivals. AQAP's social cleansing of sexual minorities in 2014 and 2015 overlaps with its rivalry with Ansarallah, also called the Houthi rebels, a group that some have claimed are repressing homosexual communities, albeit in ways falling short of violent attacks (Gladstone 2015). Lastly, as mentioned in the article, the Shining Path did not yet have competing rivals at the time it first executed sexual minorities in 1986 and 1988. However, all the other incidents in Peru took place during a period of contestation between the Shining Path and MRTA. This follows the theoretically posited sequence outlined in the paper, where an insurgent group (the Shining Path) targets sexual minorities under their control after similar violence by the state, which then spread to active rivals (MRTA).

According to the UCDP conflict encyclopedia, the Armed Islamic Group's (GIA) insurgency in Algeria closely overlapped with that of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Unlike AIS, the GIA controlled territory in the country and was committed to establishing an Islamic state under its rule. As expected by outbidding theory, GIA responded to competition by perpetrating mass civilian killings; similarly, as predicted by the outbidding theory outlined in the present paper, the extreme tactics adopted by GIA included the monitoring and execution of sexual minorities. Rather than responding by outbidding, however, the more moderate FIS acquiesced to the state and itself was integrated into a force that combatted the GIA in 1997. This is the last recorded year for which there is reliable information that the GIA targeted sexual minorities. Although not entirely conclusive, this sequence accords with the outbidding theory that GIA apparently stopped its murder of sexual minorities after its insurgent rivalry ended.

In 1999, the Chechen Republic started executing homosexuals, a decision that was in part driven by competition from other organizations. To quote from Ware (2005, 99):

In an apparent effort to compete with Islamist warlords in Chechnya, Maskhadov [President of the Chechen Republic] disbanded parliament, signed a constitution resembling that of Sudan, and established Sharia courts in Chechnya. These courts sentenced people to death, mutilation, and flogging. They executed people for crimes such as adultery and homosexuality.

The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia also marks 1999 as the year in which the Wabbahi Movement of the Buinaksk District in the Dagestan region of the North Caucasus was actively engaged in conflict against Russia. This group sought to establish an Islamic State in the entire Dagestan-Chechnya region. In order to enhance its credibility vis-à-vis this and other rivals, Maskhadov declared his de facto state the Islamic Republic of Ichkeria and implemented sharia law. Again, there is no concrete evidence that the Republic executed homosexuals after the defeat of its rivals when Russia occupied Dagestan, although it is certainly possible that this results simply from a lack of information.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the Liberian civil war notes that homosexuality was a cause for murder during the conflict. The only identifiable instance of such violence was the murder of Tecumseh Roberts, known as the “Liberian Michael Jackson,” who INPFL leader Prince Yormie Johnson admitted was killed due to his sexuality (see TRC 2009, Vol. 2, 67; West 2012). As documented in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (and extensively elsewhere), the INPFL was a more radical breakaway faction and competitor of Charles Taylor’s NPFL. The group is most notorious for capturing, torturing, and killing Liberian President Samuel Doe, conforming to more general outbidding predictions regarding extreme violence under competitive environments.


Some final words regarding the competition between ISIS and al-Qaeda are in order, a rivalry coded as ongoing in the dataset since their split. The general competition and conflict between the former parent and offspring organizations have been well-documented and analyzed (Mendelsohn 2014; Byman 2015; Byman 2016), so there is only additional need to discuss this competition as it relates to the targeting of sexual minorities. ISIS has continually attempted to outbid al-Qaeda by adopting more extreme and identity-based violence, evident as early as al-Zarqawi’s sectarian attacks against Shia Muslims despite al-Qaeda central’s denouncements (McCants 2015). Often this schism manifests itself in conflict in regional theaters of operation. For instance, the ISIS branch in Libya has come under literal attack from al-Qaeda linked militants in the city of Derna (Musa 2015). Rather than its stronghold of Sirte, ISIS has undertaken its purges against homosexuals in this competitive environment—where it ultimately lost, against suggesting homophobic violence as a last-ditch effort to gain support—providing strong support for the outbidding theory of violence.

Although it is not listed in the NSA dataset, recent terrorist attacks committed by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) also provide support for the theory from the al-Qaeda and ISIS conflict. In April 2016, members of AQIS in Bangladesh murdered two prominent gay-rights activists (Gale 2016). On its face, this tragedy appears to partially disconfirm at least one

the hypotheses because AQIS, like al-Qaeda Central, does not control territory. Yet, the incident demonstrates precisely why territory is generally necessary for any systematic targeting of sexual minorities. The primary target in the Bangladesh incident, Xulhaz Mannan, was the high-profile editor of the only LGBT oriented magazine in the country. Seeking out and identifying the target was therefore relatively straightforward and costless. In contrast, systematically identifying and selectively targeting individuals requires intensive policing and information gathering that is only possible with territorial control and a network of informants (Kalyvas 2006). AQIS is ideologically revolutionary and was established by al-Qaeda in an effort to compete with ISIS for recruits from South Asia (Barry 2014). Yet, as much as it might aspire to purge the region of sexual minorities in its goal of creating a Caliphate, AQIS is unable to systematically target LGBT individuals in absence of territorial control. What this recent attack does suggest is, per the logic of outbidding, that the intense competition between al-Qaeda and its splinter ISIS for recruits—which led to the formation of AQIS (Mendelsohn 2016, 195)—has at least transmitted the desire to signal anti-LGBT credentials through the use of violence.

## ***Section II: Independent Variables***


Many of the independent variables used in this paper come from other sources, primarily from the Non-State Actor Dataset. Descriptions and coding decisions for variables from these datasets can be found from the relevant sources. Several independent variables were created specifically for this project. As mentioned in the text, *transform* is coded based on whether the insurgent group adheres to a revolutionary ideology that may induce an exclusion mechanism. Harff (2003) provides a fuller discussion of the concept of exclusionary ideology than is possible here, but succinctly defines it as “a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principal that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people” (63). Ideologies she includes in this category are strict variants of Marxist-Leninism, Islamist ideology associated with Islamic states, rigid anticommunist doctrines, ideologies of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority, and strict secular nationalism. The exclusionary ideology framework was selected for its use in the study of genocide, a form of identity-based killing to which homophobic violence is potentially similar. Recent conceptualizations of genocide as “mass categorical violence” in fact would entail coding widespread homophobic violence as a form of genocide (Straus 2015). Yet, not all of these ideologies are as applicable to insurgent groups as to states. Very few rigidly anticommunist insurgent groups exist—an ideology more common in pro-government militias—and thus there are very few such organizations in the NSA dataset. One possible exception is the Nicaraguan Contras, which is included in the dataset; although they are coded 0 on the *transform* variable in the main analysis, recoding as 1 does not change the results since there are so few observations with this group.



Similarly, few insurgent groups fighting over the central government in the NSA dataset have ethnonationalist or racial superiority doctrines as a central component of their ideology. Some separatist organizations in the dataset are virulently nationalistic, although these groups are more accurately characterized as primarily having a separatist ideology since they do not seek the transformation of the whole state or society in which they reside. Some possible exceptions include the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, composed of Hutu fighters that participated in the Rwandan genocide, and armed groups during the Bosnian War, including Republika Srpska; these groups are coded positively on the *transform* variable. Finally, there are very few strict secular nationalist groups that exclude participation based on religious affiliation. Such groups are either accommodating to the religious groups or are also Marxist-Leninists. For example, the PKK in Turkey is nominally secular but has at various times made appeals to Sunni Islam and is also Marxist-Leninist.

This leaves Marxist, Islamist, and the few ethnonational supremacist groups as the ones adhering to an exclusionary ideology represented among the insurgent organizations in the NSA dataset. For the first two, various sources—such as the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and case-specific sources—are used to determine whether groups adhere to a Communist/Marxist-Leninist or an Islamist ideology. Groups whose members are predominately Muslim but are primarily driven by goals other than the attempt to establish an Islamic state or society, most commonly ethnic separatism, are not coded as having an exclusionary ideology; examples of such groups are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and the Kashmir Insurgents. Although not represented among the existing states in the world, there are insurgents driven primarily by the goal of establishing a theocratic order in their states from other religions; the most well-known example is the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. These groups are also coded as 1 on *transform*. It is important to note that actual homophobic propaganda does not enter into this coding scheme. Rather, having a strong exclusionary ideology in general is hypothesized to lead to the targeting of marginalized groups in general. This decision biases against finding a positive effect for the *transform* variables, which would

Figure 2A: Additional Substantive Effects



undoubtedly be stronger if it included only those groups openly proclaiming a homophobic ideology.

Figure 1A depicts the distribution of insurgent ideology in the data. In contrast to other coding schemes using this typology (Fortna 2015), transform is the ideological category with the fewest corresponding observations—only 23 percent of the dataset. This distribution accords with the underlying concept of transformative ideologies as particularly extreme or radical ideologies, even among those held by insurgent groups. Similarly, coding schemes that result in moderate groups registering less than one percent of the data are not useful for this particular project. “Moderate” here is conceptualized as a non-extremist ideology relative to other insurgent groups, rather than the insurgents holding views that are moderate in an absolute sense. As noted in the paper, moderate groups are those seeking autonomy, rather than full-blown separatism, and those fighting over the central government seeking to replace it rather than to transform society.

One concern here is that the results presented in the main text are sensitive to alternative coding of these ideology variables. However, that does not appear to be the case. Another option would be to simply use the “conflict type” variable in the NSA dataset, which divides conflicts into categories such as civil war, coup d’etat, communist rebellion, secessionist conflict, Islamist rebellion, ethnic conflict, autonomy conflict, and terrorist conflict. Using this typology, communist and Islamist rebellion can be collapsed into *transform*, secessionist conflict and ethnic conflict can be collapsed into *separatist*, and the remainder can be collapsed into *moderate*. Re-estimating model 3 in the main text also results in a statistically and substantively

effect for *transform*, but not for *moderate*, relative to *separatist*, and in fact the coefficient for transform is larger, albeit only very slightly (2.89); the other coefficient estimates are unchanged, with the exception that democracy becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent error level. Yet the predictive power of transform is slight attenuated. This is demonstrated in figure 2A, which replicates figure 3 from the main text using the recoded ideology variables; here both confidence intervals for transform include 0.

Nevertheless, there is good reason not to base coding decision on the “conflict type” variable in the NSA dataset. For one, the NSA codebook states that the variable does not constitute a mutually exclusive typology, and indicates that it can be used for identifying conflicts. Both of these suggest it was not intended to serve for coding purposes. This is most evident for the Communist rebellion category, as this is used in the alternative coding for the transform variable. Although there do not seem to be any false positives (communist rebellions that are incorrect identified as such), there are number of false negatives (cases that are not coded as communist rebellions that should be). For example, neither the Khmer Rouge nor the Communist Party of Nepal—Maoist are coded as Communist rebellions, although these insurgent groups both sought to topple their respective governments and to impose a Communist state in their place. Other groups coded as transform that are not counted as Communist rebellions in the NSA dataset include FARC, ELN, and Devrimci Sol, which are more ambiguous cases despite their Marxist-Leninist and Communist origins. Recoding these groups as moderate rather than revolutionary does not impact the substantive or statistical significance of the main results. One Islamist group not coded as Islamist by the NSA dataset, Islamic Jihad Movement in Israel, is coded as revolutionary in the main analysis, but changing this coding also does not impact the results.

As mentioned earlier, changing the coding for the Nicaraguan Contras also has no influence. Moreover, changing the few ethnonational supremacist groups to moderate, since this ideology is also more commonly associated with pro-government militias, also does not change the results. These groups are the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian Republic of Krajina, and the Serbian Republic of Herzegovina. Flipping these to *moderate* rather than *transform* results in a coefficient estimate of 2.93 for *transform*, which again is higher than the one presented in the main text. Other borderline cases exist for religious organizations that do not strive to completely implement theocracy in their respective states, such as Hezbollah, the Allied Defense Forces in Uganda, SCIRI in Iraq. Changing these organizations from *moderate* to *transform* results in a coefficient estimate of 2.86 for transform, virtually indistinguishable from that presented in the main text. None of these changes drops the statistical significant of *transform* below the 1 percent error ( $p$ -value = 0.006-0.007 in every estimation), and the results remain unchanged for the other theoretically relevant independent variables.

The key independent variable, *rival*, also warrants some additional discussion. As outlined in Metelits’s (2009) research, the concept of active rivalry is more restrictive than the much broader operationalizations used in quantitative literature on outbidding. Although the

**Table 2A. Crosstab of Targeting and Rival**

|                  |       | <i>Rival</i> |       |  |
|------------------|-------|--------------|-------|--|
| <i>Targeting</i> | 0     | 1            | Total |  |
| 0                | 1,261 | 261          | 1,522 |  |
| 1                | 4     | 19           | 23    |  |
| Total            | 1,265 | 278          | 1,545 |  |


large-N nature of the present study precludes implementing a more nuanced coding scheme, which Metelits accomplishes using a small-N fuzzy set analysis, the attempt to code based on the active components of rivalry, as described in the main text, result in the creation of a dataset with a small percentage of observations coded 1 on rivalry. Of the 1545 observations, 278 insurgent-years or approximately 18 percent are coded as engaging in active rivalry. With few exceptions, such as the longstanding competition among Palestinian groups, this suggests that most insurgents are not engaged in rivalries over the same population, or at least not for very long. Some states like India and Myanmar have been plagued by numerous insurgencies for decades, but these are largely regionally located groups that little competition for the territories over which they are fighting. When it does emerge, competition is a potentially unstable and can lead one competitor to defeat, absorb, or drive out another (Cronin 2009). For instance, the LTTE in Sri Lanka enters the dataset with two active rivals. However, the competitors soon drop out of the dataset as they overtaken by the more radical and powerful insurgent group (see Bloom 2005 for a discussion of this process), and the LTTE remains the only non-state actor fighting against the Sri Lankan government for most of the years listed.

Table 2A depicts a crosstab of the dependent variable *targeting* and the independent variable for *rival*. Despite the few positive values on the key independent variable, this table demonstrates that the coding is not afflicted by tautology. Since there are few positive values on the dependent variable, these dyad-year instances of insurgent homophobic violence comprise well under ten percent (approximately 7.3) of the dyad-years where an insurgent group is embroiled in an active rivalry.

### ***Section III: Robustness Checks***

Given the rarity of homophobic violence against sexual minorities, only 23 of the total 1,545 observation, it is possible that the results from the main analysis are biased (King and Zheng 2001). To see whether this is the case, all three models from the article are estimated using rare


Figure 3A: Results



events logistic regressions. Figure 3A presents these models visually alongside the original three for comparison. As it demonstrates, there is no appreciable difference in the substantive or statistical significance in the rare events models when compared with the logistic regression models. Table 3A presents the regression output that is graphically represented here, which includes the results from figure 1 in the paper along with those from the rare events logistic regression models. In all the models, the coefficient for *rival* is highly statistically significant at well above the 0.01 level.

An additional robustness test is conducted using a matching algorithm in order to compensate for the fact that rivalry is not randomly assigned. Matching is a procedure that operates by pruning the data and pairing subjects in the treatment group with ones in the control group that have similar values on a vector of covariates; observations with no appropriate matches are eliminated and the remaining observations are weighted. In other words, a more “balanced” dataset is constructed by rendering control variables in the treatment and control groups more similar. Even though the presence of rivalry cannot be manipulated experimentally, this approach allows us to regard rivalry as comparable to a “treatment.” Exact matching is used

Figure 4A: Results from Matching Analysis




N = 824  
 95 percent confidence intervals

to match on observable characteristics, the list of covariates, and organize observations into strata that contain all possible combinations of covariates for which there is at least one treatment (rival) and control (no rival) observation.<sup>1</sup> In total, 824 matches are identified from the original dataset, 272 with rivalries and 552 without, and organized into 55 strata. This resulting and more balanced dataset is used to replicate three of the preceding logistic regression models. As shown in figure 4A, rivalry is still substantively and statistically significant when using the matched data. Support for the positive effect of two other theoretically relevant variables, *state* and *territory*, is also evident. Although its point estimate is still relatively high, *transform* is now statistically significant only at the 10 percent error level. Despite well-founded doubts about the ability of matching to estimate causal effects above that offered by regression analysis (Sekhon 2009), finding positive support for the central independent variable, *rivalry*, across methods only improves confidence in its explanatory power. Although the findings for *transform* are not as strong as previously, the role of ideology is examined more thoroughly in the case studies. Figure 4A contains the results from this matching analysis.

<sup>1</sup> This procedure is accomplished using the coarsened exact matching program (Blackwell et. al 2009). All of the covariates are, however, discrete and cannot be coarsened further. CEM simply performs exact matching on these non-continuous variables.

Figure 5A: Robustness Checks



N = 1545  
 95 percent confidence intervals

It is desirable to test the sensitivity of these results under alternative model specifications. For the paper, only seven control variables were used—including the three time control—in order to keep the model parsimonious and restricted to theoretically relevant variables (Achen 2005). This section of the appendix will use additional control variables. Two additional and potentially relevant variables from the Non-State Actor Dataset are *polwing* and *transtate*. The first is a binary indicator of whether or not the non-state actor has a political wing. Theoretically, we should expect that groups with a political wing are less likely to target sexual minorities and to commit extreme forms of violence in general, since in many cases they have the intent to engage in non-violent politics from which they might be disbarred after committing atrocities. The second variable is an ordinal measure of whether or not the non-state actor is present in another state, where no presence is coded as 0, some presence is coded 1, and extensive presence coded as 2. It is plausible that groups with transnational presence are more likely to commit extreme violence, since they can retreat to their external bases should harsh tactics result in backlash from the general population or a more concerted effort by state forces (Salehyan 2007).

Model 10 in figure 3A replicates the full model, model 6 from the paper, with the addition of these two control variables. As predicted, *polwing* is statistically significant and negatively related to targeting sexual minorities. However, *transtate* has no effect. The coefficient for *rival*, the central independent variable, is still statistically significant at the 0.01

percent level. Once again accounting for the small number of positive values on the dependent variable, model 11 repeats model 9 using a rare events logistic regression and the results hold. Model 12 replicates this full model but uses robust standard errors clustered on state instead of insurgent group. In addition to independence among events committed by the same organization, the rivalry hypothesis assumes that insurgent tactical and targeting decisions are not independent within states. Model 13 raises the level of analysis and clusters on region—using North America, Latin America, West Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the six regions—again under the assumption that observations within regions suffer from a lack of statistical independence. The primary results are also robust to these alterations, with the rival coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 percent error level, indicating that the results are not sensitive to minor changes in model specification. This is also true for the three other theoretically relevant variables for which there are positive results in the main analysis—*state*, *territory*, and *transform*—which indicates that their effects on homophobic violence are also not sensitive to small changes in model specification. These results are presented in figure 5A.

**Table 3A: Results from Figure 1**

|           | <i>Model 0A</i>    | <i>Model 0B</i>    | <i>Model 1</i>     | <i>Model 2</i>     | <i>Model 3</i>     | <i>Model 4</i>     | <i>Model 5</i>     | <i>Model 6</i>     |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Rival     | 3.13***<br>(0.66)  | 3.03***<br>(0.55)  | 5.10***<br>(0.71)  | 4.91***<br>(0.79)  | 4.49***<br>(0.82)  | 4.21***<br>(0.77)  | 3.81***<br>(1.08)  | 3.55***<br>(1.06)  |
| State     |                    |                    |                    |                    | 1.53***<br>(0.41)  | 1.45***<br>(0.34)  | 1.33***<br>(0.37)  | 1.23***<br>(0.33)  |
| Territory |                    |                    |                    |                    | 1.37**<br>(0.60)   | 1.27***<br>(0.49)  | 1.43**<br>(0.61)   | 1.30**<br>(0.54)   |
| Transform |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    | 2.87***<br>(1.07)  | 2.23**<br>(1.01)   |
| Moderate  |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    | 0.45<br>(1.25)     | 0.33<br>(1.23)     |
| Multiple  |                    |                    | -2.67***<br>(0.62) | -2.60***<br>(0.74) | -1.77**<br>(0.72)  | -1.67**<br>(0.71)  | -2.12**<br>(0.88)  | -2.02**<br>(0.90)  |
| Strength  |                    |                    | 0.81<br>(0.70)     | 0.84<br>(0.55)     | 0.68<br>(0.66)     | 0.72<br>(0.58)     | 0.55<br>(0.71)     | 0.60<br>(0.67)     |
| Sponsor   |                    |                    | 0.32<br>(0.73)     | 0.28<br>(0.55)     | 0.05<br>(0.65)     | 0.00<br>(0.54)     | -0.57<br>(0.65)    | -0.56<br>(0.58)    |
| Democracy |                    |                    | -0.26<br>(0.96)    | -0.18<br>(0.668)   | 1.14<br>(0.81)     | 1.16**<br>(0.56)   | 1.10<br>(0.84)     | 1.12*<br>(0.60)    |
| Constant  | -5.75***<br>(0.61) | -5.63***<br>(0.50) | -5.21***<br>(0.77) | -5.03***<br>(0.57) | -7.56***<br>(1.28) | -7.16***<br>(0.95) | -8.31***<br>(1.11) | -7.32***<br>(1.02) |
| Model     | Logit              | Relogit            | Logit              | Relogit            | Logit              | Relogit            | Logit              | Relogit            |
| N         | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               | 1545               |

\*p<0.1 \*\*p<0.05 \*\*\*p<0.

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